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ABSTRACT
Most model-checking algorithms are based on automata the-
ory. For instance, determining whether or not a transition
system satisfies a Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formula re-
quires computing strongly connected component of its tran-
sition graph. In Software Product-Line (SPL) engineering,
the model checking problem is more complex due to the
huge amount of software products that may compose the
line. Indeed, one has to determine the exact subset of those
products that do not satisfy an intended property. Efficient
dedicated verification methods have been recently developed
to answer this problem. However, most of them does not al-
low incremental verification. In this paper, we introduce an
automata-based incremental approach for SPL model check-
ing. Our method makes use of previous results to determine
whether or not the addition of conservative features (i.e.,
features that do not remove behaviour from the system) pre-
serves the satisfaction of properties expressed in LTL. We
provide a detailed description of the approach and propose
algorithms that implement it. We discuss how our method
can be combined with SPL dedicated verification methods,
viz. Featured Transition Systems.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.2.4 [Software Engineering]: Software/Program Verifi-
cation—Model checking
General Terms
Theory, Verification
Keywords
Model Checking, Software Product Lines, Modularity.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Software Product-Line (SPL) engineering is a recent soft-
ware engineering paradigm that aims at making the develop-
ment of similar software products faster, safer and cheaper
through systematic reuse of assets. Those reusable arte-
facts can take different forms, e.g., requirements, compo-
nents, code, test cases, and others. A given product of the
SPL is then obtained through a combination of assets at
each stage of the development life cycle. Commonality and
variability between the products is usually captured via the
concept of features. In a nutshell, a feature can be regarded
as a unit of difference between products. For instance, a
feature may model the presence or absence of an optional
component, an alternative behaviour, or an additional func-
tionality. In this paper, we assume that features have no
attribute and cannot be cloned. Then a given software vari-
ant of the product line can be modelled by its (unique) set
of features. As we will see, this assumption is needed for our
current approach to be applicable.
The verification problem in the context of SPLs is more
difficult than in traditional software engineering. Indeed,
since an SPL engineering process results in multiple software
products, engineers have to provide solid evidence that ev-
ery variant works properly and in accordance to its intended
requirements. In the past years, efficient methods for SPL
model checking have been designed to address this problem
(see notably [11, 8, 10, 6, 2, 1]). However, only a few of
them are incremental [11]. It means that when a new fea-
ture is added into a specific product after this one has been
verified, most of these approaches do not allow the reuse
previous verification results to simplify upcoming verifica-
tions. Likewise, the definition and the integration of a new
feature to the whole SPL would oblige the engineer to start
over the whole checking procedure. This inability clearly
opposes the principles of SPL engineering, which advocates
systematic reuse.
Efficient reuse, however, remains an open problem in for-
mal verification. Li et al. [11] tackled it in cases where
properties to check are expressed in Computation Tree Logic
(CTL) [5]. Basically, they model both the base product (i.e.
a product without optional features) and features with finite
state machines and they derive conditions for the satisfac-
tion of a CTL formula to be preserved upon the addition
of one or more features to the base product. In this case,
the product resulting from the addition of a feature is ob-
tained by connecting the state machines of the feature onto
the state machine of the base product. Their method re-
lies on the fact that algorithms for CTL model checking
are based on (1) decomposition of the formula into a set
of subformulae; and (2) recursive computation of the set
of states satisfying those subformulae. In contrast, usual
algorithms for checking ω-regular properties expressed in
logics like Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [14] and modal µ-
calculus [9] are automata-based. Unlike the aforementioned
CTL algorithms, automata-based methods rely on language
emptiness checking rather than formula decomposition and
recursive computation. The approach of Li et al. is thus im-
practicable as such. Moreover, their method is not complete
because the non-satisfaction of the preservation conditions
does not imply the violation of the formula. Given that LTL
and CTL have incomparable expressiveness, there is thus a
need for incremental approaches to LTL model checking.
In [15], Thang extends the approach of Li et al. so that it
becomes complete. This is achieved through the definition of
sufficient conditions for the preservation to hold. In the same
vein, Liu et al. [12] propose a sound and complete approach
for incremental CTL model checking. Their algorithm is
based on variation points obligations, i.e., sets of formulae
that connected states of the system have to satisfy to ensure
the preservation of a formula upon the integration of a new
feature. Unlike the previous one, this method uses new CTL
model checking algorithms and therefore cannot be built on
top of existing model checkers.
Although it considers adaptive systems, the work of Zhang
et al. [17] is comparable to ours. Their modular LTL verifi-
cation algorithms could be adapted to determine the preser-
vation of formula upon the connection of the system with a
feature’s state machine. The resulting algorithms could be
built on top of existing model checkers. Unfortunately, they
would not benefit from previous verification results.
In this paper, we propose an automata-based approach for
determining if the addition of a feature to a system makes
it violate an LTL formula it previously satisfied. More par-
ticularly, we focus here on conservative features as defined
in [7], that is, features that do not remove existing behaviour
of the system. As shown in this paper, the effect of conser-
vative features on systems behaviour can be reduced to the
addition of states and transitions. This allows us to de-
rive necessary and sufficient conditions for the preservation
of LTL formulae. The extension of this method to larger
classes of features is more difficult and left for future work.
Our approach does not visit the entire state space of the new
system and is thus potentially more efficient than a new ver-
ification performed from scratch. Also, the implementation
of our method makes use of traditional LTL model-checking
algorithms and can thus be built on top of existing tools.
Structure. The rest of the paper is organised as follows.
Section 2 recapitulates the theoretical background needed
for a thorough understanding of our approach. In Section 3,
we present how we model a system, a conservative feature,
as well as the result of integrating a conservative feature
into the system. Next, Section 4 describes the conditions
needed to ensure that the addition of a conservative feature
preserves the satisfaction of a property, whereas Section 5
presents algorithms to check if these conditions are met.
2. BACKGROUND
We first summarize the principles of LTL model checking
for systems modelled as transition systems. Then, we fo-
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Figure 1: A TS modelling a routing protocol.
cus on the definition of conservative feature as it has been
introduced in our previous work [7].
2.1 Automata-Based Model Checking
Transition systems (TSs) are commonly used to model the
behaviour of systems. These are defined as follows.
Definition 1 A TS is a tuple M = (S, Act, →, I, AP, L),
where S is a set of states, Act a set of actions,→⊆ S×Act×
S the transition relation, I ⊆ S a set of initial states, AP
a set of atomic propositions, and L : S → P(AP ) function
that labels each state with the set of atomic propositions it
satisfies.
An execution of M is a non-empty, infinite sequence pi =
s0α1s1α2 . . . where s0 ∈ I and (si, αi+1, si+1) ∈→ (also
noted si
αi+1−−−→ si+1) for all 0 ≤ i. The semantics of an
execution is given as the sequence of sets of atomic proposi-
tions satisfied at each step of the execution. The semantics
of a TS M (also called the behaviour of M), written [[M]],
is then the union of the semantics of its executions.
An example of TS is given in Figure 1. This small tran-
sition system depicts a simple packet routing protocol. The
system starts in ready state. Once it receives a packet, it
enters received state before routing the packet through a re-
liable channel (routed-safe state) and reaching sent state.
Finally, it goes back to ready state.
In this paper, we focus on verifying the behaviour of a TS
against LTL formulae. Vardi and Wolper [16] have proven
that such a verification reduces to detecting accepting cycles
in a Bu¨chi automaton.
Definition 2 A Bu¨chi automaton (BA) is a tuple (Q, Σ, δ,
Q0, F ) where Q is a set of states, Σ is the alphabet, δ ⊆
Q × Σ × Q the transition relation, Q0 ⊆ Q a set of initial
states and F ⊆ Q a set of accepting states. A BA accepts
the words that visit accepting states infinitely often.
The language of a BA is thus a set of infinite words. The
model checking algorithm proposed by Vardi and Wolper
relies on the fact that a TSM satisfies an ω-regular property
expressed as an LTL formula ϕ, notedM |= ϕ if and only if
there exists no infinite word accepted by bothM and the BA
representing the complement of ϕ, that is, L(M)∩L(A¬ϕ) =
∅. This last equation holds if and only if the language of the
synchronous product of M and A¬ϕ is empty.
Definition 3 The synchronous product of a TS M = (S,
Act, →, I, AP, L) and a BA B = (Q, P(AP ), δ, Q0, F ) is
the BA M⊗ B = (S × Q, Act, δ′, I × Q0, S × F ) where
(s, q, α, s′, q′) ∈ δ′ ⇔ s α−→ s′ ∧ (q, L(s), q′) ∈ δ.
Formally, the non-emptiness condition in a BA (Q, P(AP ),
δ, Q0, F ) is given by
∃i ∈ I • ∃f ∈ F • ∃(w, v) ∈ Q∗ ×Q+ •
f ∈ δ∗(i, w) ∩ δ∗(f, v) (1)
where δ∗(s, w) is the set of states that can be reached from
s by reading the word w. We can thus determine if the
language of the synchronous product is empty by first com-
puting the set of reachable accepting states and, for each
such accepting state s, checking if there exists a non-empty
path from s to itself.
2.2 Conservative Features
Variability as represented by features can take a wide va-
riety of forms. The presence of a feature may modify the
architecture of the software (by adding or removing compo-
nents), enable or disable functionalities, or even alter the be-
haviour of the system in particular situations spread through
its whole execution. LetM be a TS modelling the behaviour
of a software product p. The activation of a feature f in p
yields a new product p⊕ f whose behaviour is modelled by
a TS M′. Given the wide variety of effects a feature can
have on the system, there is in general no relation between
M and M′. It is thus particularly difficult to analyse the
behavioural impact of features incrementally. For example,
if a feature modifies the type of acknowledgement used in a
routing protocol, it is difficult to assess whether or not the
new type of acknowledgement has drawbacks that the old
one did not without in-depth analyses.
However, when a considered feature satisfies specific con-
ditions, we can define a preorder relation between the be-
haviour of M and the behaviour of M′. In this paper, we
consider features that do not remove existing behaviour from
the product to which they are added. These are called con-
servative features [4, 7]. In this specific case,M′ can repro-
duce any behaviour in M. One can formally characterize
this behavioural inclusion via the notion of simulation [13].
Definition 4 Let Mi = (Si, Acti,→i, Ii, AP, Li), i ∈ {1, 2}
be transition systems over AP . A simulation for (M1,M2)
is a binary relation R ⊆ S1 × S2 such that
1. ∀s1 ∈ I1 • ∃s2 ∈ I2 • (s1, s2) ∈ R and
2. ∀(s1, s2) ∈ R it holds that
(a) L1(s1) = L2(s2) and
(b) ∀s′1 ∈ Post(s1) • ∃s′2 ∈ Post(s2) • (s′1, s′2) ∈ R.
where Post(s) = {s2 | ∃α • s α−→ s2)} denotes the set of
states that can be reached from s in one transition. Then,
M2 simulates M1, denoted by M1 4 M2 if there exists a
simulation for (M1,M2). If M2 4M1 also holds then M1
and M2 are called simulation-equivalent, noted M1 'M2.
Accordingly, if f is a conservative feature then M 4M′.
Given that this relation holds between the two TS, one can
infer properties about M′ knowing the properties of M. In
particular, if M violates an LTL formula ϕ then so does
M′ [13, 3]. If we transpose this result in the context of
product lines, we obtain the following.
Property 5 Let f be a conservative feature, M the TS
modelling the behaviour of a product p and M′ the TS mod-
elling p⊕f . Then for any LTL formula ϕ,M 6|= ϕ⇒M′ 6|=
ϕ.
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Figure 2: A TS+ modelling a feature of the routing
protocol.
Thus, the LTL formulae violated by M do not need to
be verified in M′ – the latter TS violates these formulae as
well. On the contrary, we cannot infer anything about the
formulae that M satisfies. The objective of this paper is to
provide methods that aim at reducing the verification effort
of those formulae in M′.
3. FEATURES COMPOSITION
Like Li et al. [11], we propose to model the behaviour
of an SPL composed of conservative features by a set of
automata. One of these automata – viz. a TS – models the
behaviour of a rough system called the base product. We
denote it by C. Basically, only mandatory features are part
of this product, which is thus not necessarily valid according
to the constraints between the features. Then, we propose
to model optional features by a set of TS.
In addition to the usual constructs, we provide any such
TS F with activation conditions that determine when the
feature makes the system reach that TS, and return condi-
tions that define when the execution reaches anew a state of
the base product. In this paper, we propose to specify both
the activation condition and the return condition as a subset
of states in C. In F , the concept of initial state is irrelevant
since, as we will see, the initial states of the composition
of F with C are the initial states of C. We assume that all
the automata are defined over the same set AP of atomic
propositions. This results in a Transition System + (TS+),
defined as follows. Note that in order to avoid ambiguity,
we annotate each component of a TS M with a subscript
M, e.g. SC denotes the set of states of C.
Definition 6 A TS+ defined over a TS C is a tuple (S, Act,
→, APC , L,A,R) where S, Act, AP, L are defined as in TS,
S ∩ SC = ∅, A ⊆ SC is the activation condition, R ⊆ SC is
the return condition, and →⊆ (S ∪A)×Act× (S ∪R) is the
transition relation.
We call activation (resp. return) state any state s ∈ A (resp.
s ∈ R). An example of TS+ is given in Figure 2. It models
the feature allowing our routing protocol to send packets in
unreliable channels. Activation and return states are discon-
tinuous circle; the transitions leaving (resp. reaching) these
states are represented as discontinuous lines.
Accordingly, the behavioural model for a whole product
line is defined as follows.
Definition 7 An SPL is a tuple (C, d, γ) where C is the base
product, d = (F, [[d]] ⊆ P(P(F ))) is a feature model, and γ is
a function that associates each feature in F with a (possibly
empty) set of TS+ {Ff1 , . . . ,Ffk} over C.
The composition of the base product with a feature f
yields a new TS that is obtained by connecting each TS+ Ffi
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Figure 3: The composition of a TS with a TS+.
associated with f on to C. The states that are actually linked
to each others are determined according to the activation
conditions and the return conditions.
Definition 8 The composition of a TS C with a TS+ F
over C is the TS C⊕F = (SC ∪SF , ActC ∪ActF , →C ∪ →F ,
IC , APC , LC ∪ LF ).
Intuitively, any transition in C or F is also a transition in
C ⊕ F . An execution of the composed system is able to
reach the state space of the feature via the states of the base
product that meet the activation condition. Similarly, the
system can go back to the state space of the base product
via a return state. For instance, we show in Figure 3 the
result of composing the routing protocol (see Figure 1) with
the above TS+ (see Figure 2).
Note that these definitions are restrictive because they
consider only features that do not interact. In other words,
each feature modifies the behaviour of the base product only.
Although it could raise additional issues, we can extend our
approach to handle such cases. We briefly discuss this ex-
tension at the end of Section 5.
Next, we establish the link between features modelled as
above and conservative features. Given that composition
removes neither states nor transitions in the base product,
any feature modelled as a set of TS+ is conservative. The
following theorem shows that the converse also holds, i.e.
that the effect of any conservative feature can be expressed
by a TS+.
Theorem 9 Let f be a conservative feature and f(M) the
result of integrating f into a TS M. Then there exists a
TS+ F such that M⊕F is simulation-equivalent to f(M).
Proof Sketch. Let F the TS+ (Sf(M), Actf(M),→f(M)
, APf(M), Lf(M), IM, ∅). Then L(M⊕F) = L(Munionmulti f(M))
where unionmulti denotes the disjoint union. We thus have M ⊕
F ≈ L(M unionmulti f(M)) and consequently f(M) 4 M ⊕ F .
Since f is conservative we have M 4 f(M), which implies
Munionmulti f(M) 4 f(M)unionmulti f(M) = f(M). By transitivity of the
simulation relation, M⊕F and f(M) are thus simulation-
equivalent.
4. NON-PRESERVATION CONDITIONS
When a feature is added to a system that has already
been checked against an LTL formula, it is in general diffi-
cult to assess whether or not the behavioural modifications
performed by the feature endanger the satisfaction of that
formula. However, for a conservative feature f , the com-
position of a system with f yields a new system with more
behaviour, that is, the semantics of the new system includes
that of the old one. The burden of reverification can thus be
reduced by analysing only the new execution paths created
as a result of the composition. In this section, we present
necessary and sufficient conditions for the satisfaction of an
LTL formula to be preserved upon the addition of a conser-
vative feature into the system.
Our approach relies on the fact that the synchronous prod-
uct ⊗ is distributive over the composition operator ⊕. To
formalise this, we introduce the notions of Bu¨chi Automa-
ton + (BA+) and composition between BA and BA+. We
define the synchronous product between a TS+ (S, Act,
trans, AP, L,A,R) and a BA (Q, P(AP ), δ, Q0, F ) as
the BA+ (Q′ = S × Q, Act, δ′, F ′ = S × F , A′ = A × Q,,
R′ = R×Q) where δ′ is defined as is Definition 3, A′ and R′
are respectively called the activation sets and the return sets
as in Definition 8. The composition of this automaton with
a BA (Q′′, Act′′, δ′′, Q0′′, F ′′) yields a new BA (Q′ ∪ Q′′,
Act ∪Act′′, δ′ ∪ δ′′, Q0′′, F ′ ∪ F ′′).
By construction, ⊗ is indeed distributive over ⊕. This im-
plies that we can analyse modularly the language emptiness
of the BA+ resulting from the composition of the TS+ of a
conservative feature with the BA of the formula.
As mentioned in Section 2, an LTL formula is violated
if and only if there exists a reachable cycle that contains
an accepting state in the synchronous product. Let us sup-
pose that the base product satisfies the formula. Let us as-
sume a conservative feature modelled by a single TS+ noted
F . Then the integration of the feature to the base product
creates a violation of the formula if and only if one of the
following four conditions is met :
1. There exists an accepting cycle in F ⊗B that is reach-
able from an activation state reachable in C ⊗ B.
2. There exists an accepting cycle in C ⊗B that is reach-
able only via F ⊗ B.
3. The feature creates an accepting cycle partly in (C⊗B)
and partly in (F ⊗ B) that has an accepting state in
F ⊗ B.
4. The feature creates an accepting cycle partly in (C⊗B)
and partly in (F ⊗ B) that has an accepting state in
C ⊗ B.
We formalise these conditions in the following four subsec-
tions.
4.1 Accepting cycle in F ⊗ B
In this case, the state space introduced by the feature
contains an accepting cycle that is reachable from the base
product. Formally, this condition is given by
∃a ∈ AF⊗B ∩R(C ⊗ B) • ∃f ∈ FF⊗B •
∃(w, v) ∈ Q∗F⊗B ×Q+F⊗B • f ∈ δ∗(a,w) ∩ δ∗(f, v) (2)
where RA denotes the set of reachable states in an automa-
ton A, that is,
RA = {q ∈ QA | ∃q0 ∈ (Q0)A •
∃w ∈ Q∗A • q ∈ δ∗A(q0, w)}
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Figure 4: Third non-preservation condition.
Given that the accepting cycle is reachable from the state
space of the base product, it turns out that the addition of
the feature does not preserve the satisfaction of the prop-
erty. This first condition is almost independent from the
base product; the only information needed is whether or not
the base product can reach an activation state of the feature
leading to the accepting cycle. Thus, its analysis is modular
as it does not require to perform a complete reverification
of the base product.
4.2 Accepting cycle in C⊗B reachable only from
F ⊗ B
Even if no violation were reported when checking the base
product, the absence of accepting cycle in the synchronous
product C ⊗ B is not guaranteed. Indeed, this cycle may
exist and not be reachable from any initial state C ⊗ B. We
thus have to verify that the addition of the feature does not
create an additional path to this accepting cycle. Formally,
this condition is given by
∃a ∈ AF⊗B ∩R(C ⊗ B) • ∃f ∈ FC⊗B \ R(C ⊗ B) •
∃(w, v) ∈ Q∗F⊗B ×Q+F⊗B • f ∈ δ∗(a,w) ∩ δ∗(f, v) (3)
Again, we do not need to reverify the base product to assess
this condition.
4.3 Accepting Cycle in (C ⊗ B)⊕ (F ⊗B) with an
Accepting State in F × B
In this third case, the acceptance cycle is not due to
the behaviour of the feature alone, but from a combina-
tion of the feature and the base product. More precisely,
there exists an accepting cycle which is partly in F ⊗B and
partly in C ⊗ B. Figure 4 illustrates this situation, which
can occur when checking the routing protocol against the
LTL formula ¬♦¬(safe ∨ sent) (that is, the system can-
not reach infinitely often a state where neither sent nor safe
holds). The base product eventually reaches an activation
state (receive) and enters the state space introduced by
the feature. Then, the feature pursues the execution, passes
through an accepting state (viz. routed-unsafe) and even-
tually reaches a return state (send) which is a predecessor
of the activation state. Formally, this condition can be ex-
pressed as follows :
∃a ∈ AF⊗B ∩R(C ⊗ B) • ∃f ∈ FF⊗B •
∃r ∈ RF⊗B • ∃(w, v, u) ∈ Q∗F⊗B ×Q+F⊗B ×Q∗C⊗B •
f ∈ δ∗F⊗B(a,w) ∧ r ∈ δ∗F⊗B(f, v) ∧ a ∈ δ∗C⊗B(r, u) (4)
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Figure 5: Fourth non-preservation condition.
Although this condition involves the base product, it does
not require to recompute information that has been already
computed during the verification of the base product.
4.4 Accepting Cycle in (C ⊗ B)⊕ (F ⊗B) with an
Accepting State in C × B
The last of the four conditions defines that a feature intro-
duces a violation if it creates a cycle containing an accepting
state of C ⊗ B. Formally,
∃a ∈ AF⊗B ∩R(C ⊗ B) • ∃r ∈ RF⊗B •
∃f ∈ FC⊗B • ∃(w, v, u) ∈ Q∗F⊗B ×Q∗C⊗B ×Q∗F⊗B •
f ∈ δ∗C⊗B(r, w) ∧ a ∈ δ∗C⊗B(f, v) ∧ r ∈ δ∗F⊗B(a, u) (5)
We exemplify this case in Figure 5, where we observe that
the addition of the feature has created a cycle that did
not exist before. This situation may occur when checking
the routing protocol against the LTL formula ¬♦(¬safe∧
©sent) (the system cannot reach an unsafe state then send
a package infinitely often). From the state routed-unsafe,
the system may reach a state sent which is accepting. The
system may cycle around this state and thus violates the
formula. Unlike the previous ones, this condition needs to
update information computed during the verification of the
base product, and is thus not modular.
4.5 Correctness and Completeness
It turns out that the four aforementioned conditions are
necessary and sufficient to assess the non-preservation of a
formula that the system satisfied prior to the addition of the
feature. We first prove that any violation discovered thanks
to the four conditions indeed corresponds to a violation of
the formula represented by B in C ⊕ F .
Theorem 10 Let C be a TS, F be a TS+ and B a BA such
that Equations (2), (3), (4), or (5) hold for C, F , and B.
Then there exists a reachable accepting cycle in (C⊕F)⊗B.
Proof. We first show that Equation (2) implies Equa-
tion (1). Given that the activation state a is reachable in
C ⊗ B, we have
∃i ∈ IC⊗B • ∃u ∈ Q∗C⊗B • a ∈ δ∗C⊗B(i, u)
which, in conjunction with Equation (2), implies that
∃i ∈ I(C⊕F)⊗B • ∃u,w ∈ Q∗(C⊕F)⊗B, w ∈ Q+(C⊕F)⊗B •
f ∈ δ∗(C⊕F)⊗B(i, uw) ∩ δ∗(C⊕F)⊗B(f, v).
The above equation is equivalent to Equation (1) applied to
(C ⊕ F) ⊗ B. The proof for the second condition is very
similar and omitted here.
Let us consider the last two conditions. Equation (4) im-
plies that
∃i ∈ I(C⊕F)⊗B • ∃t, w, u ∈ Q∗(C⊕F)⊗B, v ∈ Q+(C⊕F)⊗B •
f ∈ δ∗(C⊕F)⊗B(i, tw) ∩ δ∗(C⊕F)⊗B(f, vuw)
which is equivalent to Equation (1) as well. The proof that
Equation (5) implies Equation (1) is very similar and omit-
ted here.
In the following theorem, we show that the four conditions
are also sufficient. In other words, any violation of the for-
mula found in (C ⊕ F) ⊗ B which was not found in C ⊗ B
satisfies at least one of the four conditions.
Theorem 11 Let C be a TS, F be a TS+ and B a BA such
that there exists a reachable accepting cycle in (C ⊕ F) ⊗ B
which does not exist in C ⊗B. Then Equations (2), (3), (4),
or (5) holds for C, F , and B.
Proof. If there exists a reachable accepting cycle in (C⊕
F)⊗ B, then it falls into one of the following categories:
1. The complete cycle is in C ⊗ B. Then either it was
discovered when checking the language emptiness of C⊗
B or it is reachable only if the system goes through a
reachable state in F ⊗B. The latter case is equivalent
to Equation (3)
2. The complete cycle is in F⊗B. Given that the cycle is
reachable, any such case is considered in Equation (2).
3. The cycle is spread in both C ⊗ B and F ⊗B, and one
accepting state is in F ⊗B. This condition is captured
by Equation (4).
4. The cycle is spread in both C ⊗ B and F ⊗B, and one
accepting state is in C ⊗ B. This case is considered in
Equation (5).
This concludes the proof. Note that these conditions are not
exclusive, e.g., it may happen that the cycle contains an ac-
cepting state in both C ⊗ B and F ⊗ B. Nevertheless, such
cases are considered by our conditions and thus do not harm
the correctness of the proof.
5. ALGORITHMS
Thanks to the above non-preservation conditions, we are
able to determine whether or not the addition of a fea-
ture leads to the violation of a temporal property. Next,
we present an incremental algorithm that aims at verify-
ing these conditions while reusing as much as possible the
verification results related to the base product. Alternative
algorithms could be designed. However, the one we propose
here have the following strengths :
• It is sound and complete, i.e. it reports a violation if
and only if there actually exists one.
• It does not rely on a modified algorithms for checking
the base product, that is, we keep on the traditional
automata-based algorithms for LTL. It means that our
approach can be implemented on top of existing model
checkers.
• We systematically reuse information provided by a ver-
ifier when it verifies the base product.
Our algorithm is decomposed in three steps.
1. Checking the Base Product.
The first step consists in verifying that the base product
alone satisfies the formula. This is performed using the clas-
sical LTL model checking algorithms (see [16]). If this pro-
cedure reports a violation then the addition of any conser-
vative feature would yield a new system that violates the
formula as well. If no violation is found in the base product,
we record the following :
• The set of reachable states in C ⊗ B.
• For each reachable accepting state f , the set of states
that are reachable from f .
Given that the formula is satisfied, all these set are eventu-
ally computed during the search. Thus this first step does
not increase the time complexity of the classical algorithms.
2. Checking the Feature.
Next, we verify the TS+ modelling the feature against the
formula. The objectives of this step are to compute :
• The set of states in F⊗B reachable from an activation
state that is reachable in C ⊗ B.
• The set of reachable states in C ⊗ B that were not
reachable previously.
• For each accepting state f met during the above two
computations, the set of states in (C ⊗ B) ⊕ (F ⊗ B)
reachable from f .
The first two computations allow us to update the set of
reachable states that was computed in the previous step.
Thanks to the third one, we can determine if one of the
first three non-preservation conditions hold (namely if an
accepting state reached during the exploration belongs to a
cycle) and we can record the set of states reachable from
every accepting state for other future verifications.
This search is performed through a slightly modified vari-
ant of the classical LTL model checking algorithms. Func-
tion ExtDFS provides this algorithm. Its input are a BA
(i.e., B = C ⊗ B), a BA+ (that is, B+ = F ⊗ B), the set
of reachable states in B (RB), and a function RFB that as-
sociates each accepting state f of B with the set of states
reachable from f in B. It performs a nested deep-first search
to determine whether or not there exists an accepting cycle
that meets one of the first three non-preservation conditions.
If there does exist one, it returns ⊥. Otherwise, it returns
RB⊕B+ as well as a function RFB⊕B+ that associates each
accepting states f of B ⊗ B+ with a set of states reach-
able from f in B ⊗ B+. For an accepting state f that was
not reached during step 1, RFB⊕B+(f) contains all the states
reachable from f . However, for an accepting state f ′ visited
during step 1, RFB⊕B+(f ′) contains only the states that f ′
can reach in B. Such a set will be updated during the next
step. Apart from these return values, the function is very
similar to the standard implementation for automata-based
LTL model checking.
The function ExtInner, which determines the set of states
in B ⊗ B+ reachable from an accepting state f , is however
Input: A BA B, a BA+ B+, RB and RFB .
Output: ⊥ or (RB⊕B+ , RFB⊕B+).
1 RB⊕B+ ← RB ;
2 RFB⊕B+ ← RFB ;
3 Stack ← [];
4 foreach q0 ∈ AB+ ∩RB do
5 push(q0, Stack);
6 end
7 while Stack 6= [] do
8 q ← top(Stack);
9 Post =
(⋃
α∈Act
B⊕B+
δB⊕B(q)
) \ RB⊕B+ ;
10 if Post = ∅ then
11 pop(Stack);
12 if q ∈ FB ∪ FB+ then
13 inner ← ExtInner(q,B,B+, Stack,RFB⊕B+);
14 if inner =⊥ then
15 return ⊥;
16 end
17 RFB⊕B+ ←
ExtInner(q,B,B′, Stack,RFB⊕B+);
18 end
19 end
20 foreach q′ ∈ Post do
21 RB⊕B+ ←RB⊕B+ ∪ {q′};
22 push(q′, Stack);
23 end
24 end
Function ExtDFS(B, B+, RB , RFB)
different as it makes use of the results obtained previously.
At each iteration, three cases may occur depending on the
newly reached state :
(L. 7–9) The state is on the Outer stack. It means there exists
a path from this state to f , and thus a reachable cycle
including f . Consequently, the function returns ⊥.
(L. 11–21) It is an accepting state f ′ such that we already com-
puted the set of states reachable from f ′. We immedi-
ately check if one such state is on the stack. If it does,
then one of the first three conditions is met, i.e., there
exists an accepting cycle that includes states from both
B and B+. Otherwise we insert the states reachable
from f ′ into RFB⊕B+(f). Moreover, if f ′ has been dis-
covered during the first step, we pursue the DFS start-
ing from the activation states reachable from f ′ (see
L. 16–19).
(L. 22–24) It is none of the above. We simply push this state on
the stack and continue exploring.
3. Checking the fourth condition
The last step involves the verification of the fourth non-
preservation condition (i.e., the existence of a reachable ac-
cepting cycle containing states of both B and B+ when the
accepting states have already been visited during the first
step). If no violation is detected, it means that the system
augmented with the feature satisfies the formula. In this
case, this step updates the sets RFB⊕B+(f) for any accepting
state f of B discovered during step 1. Function ExtUpdate
performs this verification and the update; its inputs are B,
Input: A BA B, a BA+ B+, f ∈ FB , a stack of states
Outer, and RFB⊕B+ .
Output: ⊥ or RFB(f).
1 RFB⊕B+(f)← ∅;
2 Stack ← push(f, []);
3 while Stack 6= [] do
4 q ← pop(Stack);
5 Post =
(⋃
α∈Act
B⊕B+
δB⊕B+(q)
) \ RFB⊕B+(f);
6 foreach q′ ∈ Post do
7 if onStack(Outer, q′) then
8 return ⊥;
9 end
10 RFB⊕B+(f)←RFB⊕B+(f) ∪ {q′};
11 if q′ ∈ FB ∪ FB+ • RFB⊕B+(q′) 6=⊥ then
12 if ∃q′′ ∈ RFB⊕B+(q′) • onStack(Outer, q′′)
then
13 return ⊥;
14 end
15 RFB⊕B+(f)←RFB⊕B+(f) ∪RFB⊕B+(q′);
16 if q′ ∈ FB then
17 foreach q′′ ∈ AB+ ∩RFB⊕B+(q′) do
18 push(q′′, Stack);
19 end
20 end
21 end
22 else
23 push(q′, Stack);
24 end
25 end
26 end
Function ExtInner(B, B′, f , Outer, RFB)
B+, RB and RFB⊕B+ . It returns either ⊥ or an updated
function RFB⊕B+ . To update the set RFB⊕B+(f) for a given
f , it calls Function ExtUpdateInner, which is very similar to
ExtInner and uses the same optimisations. Therefore, we do
not provide a detailed algorithm for the latter function.
Discussion. If the formula is shown to be satisfied at
the end of step 3, then R(C⊗B)⊕(F⊗B) and RF(C⊗B)⊕(F⊗B)
are as if step 1 had been performed directly on the BA (C ⊗
B) ⊕ (F ⊗ B). Therefore, we could verify if the addition
of a new conservative feature still maintains the satisfaction
of the formula. This implies that we can relax some of the
assumptions we made earlier:
1. The conservative feature can be modelled by more than
one TS+. Indeed, each of these TS+ can be succes-
sively added and incrementally verified through the
application of step 2 and 3 upon each addition.
2. The TS+ of a conservative feature can be connected
onto the TS+ of a previously verified conservative fea-
ture. The only condition for the correctness of the
algorithm is that the features are incrementally added
in a consistent manner. For instance, a feature that
connects to another should not be integrated to the
system before the latter. The definition of formal rules
to ensure the consistency in such cases is left for future
work.
Input: A BA B, a BA+ B+, RB and RFB .
Output: ⊥ or updated RFB⊕B+ .
1 foreach f ∈ RB do
2 Outer ← push(f, []);
3 inner ← ExtUpdateInner(f,B,B′, Outer,RFB⊕B+);
4 if inner =⊥ then
5 return ⊥;
6 end
7 else
8 RFB⊕B+ ←RFB⊕B+ ∪ inner;
9 end
10 end
11 return RFB⊕B+
Function ExtUpdate(B, B+, RB , RFB⊕B+)
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented an automata-based approach
to verify conservative feature by reusing results obtained
during the verification of the base product. We showed that
such features can be modelled as a TS+, and defined the
composition of this TS+ to the TS modelling the behaviour
of the system. We proposed necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for properties (viz. LTL formulae) of the system to be
preserved after such a feature has been added.
In our future work, we plan to extend our approach to
wider classes of features. For instance, regulative features
do not augment the behaviour to the system. By adding
such feature to a system, one may make this system satisfy
a formula that it violated before, that is, by suppressing a
reachable accepting cycle in the synchronous product. The
study of incremental approaches for arbitrarily cross-cutting
features also remains an open challenge. An alternative is
to combine the above approach with variability-aware be-
havioural formalism like Featured Transition Systems [6].
Cross-cutting features can be represented as part of this for-
malism, whereas special features (e.g., conservative features)
are verified thanks to our method.
There are two other limitations we are aiming to over-
come. In our current approach, we assumed the features
to stand in a closed world. It implies that when several
features are added, how those will connect to each other is
pre-determined. On the contrary, it is likely that features
are developed independently; this can result in unexpected
interactions between them and creates behaviour that was
not anticipated. Moreover, features are not always commu-
tative; the effect of a new feature may cancel the changes of
a previous one. We thus plan to study the definition of for-
mal rules to assess what a sound ordering between features
would be.
Finally, after studying all the above extensions, we will
implement the complete approach in a tool and will evaluate
to what extent the checking time decreases, with respect to
a verification from scratch of the new system.
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